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INTRODUCTION
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (the Ex-
change Act) and Rule 10b-52 promulgated thereunder make it unlaw-
ful for any person to engage in any act that would operate as fraud or
deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.3 A private
cause of action has been read into section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by
judicial decision. 4 After establishing the appropriate limitations pe-
riod to apply to suits brought under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, 5
federal courts have allowed inquiry notice to start the running of the
limitations period. 6
1 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
3 Id.
4 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) ("Although § 10(b) does
not by its terms create an express civil remedy for its violation, and there is no indication
that Congress, or the [Securities and Exchange Commission] when adopting Rule 10b-5,
contemplated such a remedy, the existence of a private cause of action for violations of the
statute and the Rule is now well-established." (footnotes omitted)).
5 Federal courts originally required a plaintiff bringing a private suit under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to commence litigation "within one year after the discovery of
the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation." Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991). However, since
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, the courts have applied a two-years-after-
discovery period with a five-year ultimate bar to these claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)
(2006); Friedman v. Rayovac Corp., 295 F. Supp. 2d 957, 974-76 (W.D. Wis. 2003) (apply-
ing the two-years-after-discovery limitations period of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act although the
Act did not expressly repeal the one-year limitations period).
6 See, e.g., Newman v. Warnaco Group, Inc., 335 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2003) ("'A
plaintiff... will be deemed to have discovered fraud for purposes of triggering the statute
of limitations when a reasonable investor of ordinary intelligence would have discovered
the existence of the fraud.'" (quoting Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir.
1993))).
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Since this time, courts have been placing an ever-increasing bur-
den on investors to monitor their investments and perform the calcu-
lations typically reserved for their compensated brokers to avoid being
placed on inquiry notice despite not having actual notice of the facts
constituting their claim. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has taken part in this trend and has crossed the line by imposing on
plaintiffs an unjustifiably aggressive form of the inquiry-notice stan-
dard in DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co.7
In DeBenedictis, the plaintiff filed suit against Merrill Lynch for
making misleading statements in its registration statements relating to
fees incurred as a consequence of the purchase and holding of Class B
mutual fund shares.8 The plaintiff also claimed that Merrill Lynch
failed to disclose that its brokers had a conflict of interest because they
received greater commissions for the sale of Class B shares than for
the sale of other classes of shares.9 Rather than weigh the merits of
these claims, the court held that the plaintiff's complaint was time
barred because it was not brought within two years after "a reasonable
investor of ordinary intelligence, with the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence," would have discovered the facts constituting the claim) 0
In holding that the plaintiffs claim was time barred, the court
found that the plaintiff was placed on notice of the Class B fees by
information provided in the company's registration statements." The
court held that the plaintiff was expected to take the numbers and run
the calculations to determine which class of shares would be most ap-
propriate for purchase. 12 The court also held that the plaintiff was on
notice of the possible conflict of interest due to general news reports
on the higher commissions associated with Class B shares.1 3 In doing
so, the court did not give weight to a news report that indicated Mer-
rill Lynch was taking steps to prevent fraud against its clients. 14 This
Note will argue that the standard espoused by the Third Circuit is
7 492 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2007).
8 Id. at 213-14.
9 See id.
10 Id. at 218-19.
11 See id. at 216-17 ("[T]he Registration Statements placed investors on notice of the
relative costs and benefits of the different shares, and the possibility that [Merrill Lynch's]
sales personnel may receive different commissions in relation to the type of shares they
sold.").
12 See id. at 216 (observing that the registration statements "disclosed the fee struc-
ture" of the different classes of offered shares and asserting that "investors could calculate
on their own whether one class of shares is more economically attractive than another").
13 See id. at 217-18 ("More than two years before this action was filed, the articles in
USA Today, Time Magazine, the Wall StreetJournal, and NASD press releases were sufficient to
place a reasonable investor of ordinary intelligence on inquiry notice . ").
14 See id. (concluding that a Wall Street Journal article containing statements by Merrill
Lynch regarding suitability training for brokers "was not enough to dissipate a reasonable
investor's concerns about the fees and costs associated with Class B shares").
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ineffective and places such a great burden on the plaintiff that it frus-
trates the purpose of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
DeBenedictis raises several issues relevant to determining the
amount of evidence sufficient to place an investor on inquiry notice.
First, should general "storm warnings" 15 suffice to place investors on
inquiry notice, or should firm- and issue-specific warnings be re-
quired? The court in DeBenedictis implied that general storm warn-
ings, even if several news articles conflict, serve as evidence sufficient
to impute inquiry notice to the investor.1 6 The answer to this question
is significant because it will determine whether the lower courts can
effectively apply the inquiry-notice standard. I will argue that, in light
of the purpose of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, firm- and issue-spe-
cific information should be required. Any other conclusion would vir-
tually subvert the purpose behind the statute and make it much easier
for violators of the securities laws to avoid liability.
The second issue raised by DeBenedictis is whether an aggressive
inquiry-notice standard actually prevents fraudulent and opportunistic
claims or, rather, increases the number of potentially baseless claims.
The DeBenedictis court appears to have assumed that the ready imputa-
tion of inquiry notice on the investor will reduce opportunistic
claims. 17 However, I will argue that the uncertainty inherent in an
aggressive inquiry-notice standard will force investors to bring claims
before developing all the facts necessary to support them, thus in-
creasing the number of baseless claims and potentially clogging the
federal courts with claims that would never have been brought were a
more lenient form of inquiry notice to apply.
The third issue implicated in DeBenedictis is whether a court can
effectively apply an inquiry-notice standard based on general storm
warnings. If courts impute inquiry notice to investors on the basis of
general storm warnings, is there any way for an investor to know when
he has received sufficient information to start the running of the limi-
tations period? I will argue that the only inquiry-notice standard that
can be applied with any certainty is one based on the availability of
15 See Levitt v. Bear Stearns & Co., 340 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that "cir-
curnstances [that] would suggest to an investor of ordinary intelligence the probability that
she has been defrauded" are "often referred to as 'storm warnings.'" (quoting Dodds v.
Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993))). Throughout this Note, I will refer to an
inquiry-notice standard requiring firm- and issue-specific information as requiring "specific
storm warnings." I will refer to an inquiry-notice standard requiring only general informa-
tion as requiring "general storm warnings."
16 See DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 217-18 (concluding that the plaintiff was on inquiry
notice even though no news report implicated Merrill Lynch directly and one news report
indicated that Merrill Lynch had taken steps to prevent fraud against its clients). While the
court cites the Second Circuit's articulation of the inquiry-notice standard, id. at 217, this
Note will argue that the DeBenedictis court in fact applied a very different standard.
17 See id. at 216.
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information relating directly to the claim and to the firm with which
the investor transacted.
Part I of this Note discusses the development of inquiry notice for
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions, beginning with the Supreme
Court's decision in Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson
and concluding with articulations of the inquiry-notice standard by
various circuit courts. Part II discusses two demonstrative cases repre-
senting the two sides of the debate over inquiry notice: the Second
Circuit's decision in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.,18 which employed a
standard of inquiry notice based on company- and issue-specific infor-
mation; and the Third Circuit's decision in DeBenedictis, which low-
ered the inquiry-notice standard drastically by imputing inquiry notice
on the basis of general news articles. Part III analyzes the application
of inquiry notice in the property-law and contract notice-provision
contexts to provide a relevant analogy to the current standard in se-
curities-fraud cases. This Part will illustrate that the "general storm
warnings" inquiry-notice standard employed in DeBenedictis is not de-
fensible in light of the inquiry-notice standards employed in other
contexts. Part IV discusses the policy concerns implicated by an in-
quiry-notice standard. These concerns include the double cost im-
posed on investors by a general storm warnings standard of inquiry
notice, the prevention of fraudulent or opportunistic securities-fraud
claims without barring valid claims, and the best standard to provide
certainty in the law. Part V is an argument for an inquiry-notice stan-
dard based on the Second Circuit's application of inquiry notice in
Lentell. This Part argues that an inquiry-notice standard is necessary to
prevent abuse of the securities-fraud laws and suggests a standard that
respects the policy concerns discussed in Part IV.
I
THE EVOLUTION OF INQUIRY NOTICE
The development of inquiry-notice doctrine in section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 cases began with the Supreme Court's decision in Lampf
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson.19 However, the lower
courts have since maintained that the practice of imputing inquiry
notice to plaintiffs in these cases was not derived from any Supreme
Court precedent but is solely a development of the lower courts.2 0
While commentators have argued that actual notice should apply be-
18 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005).
19 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
20 See, e.g., Levitt, 340 F.3d at 101 (quoting Dodds, 12 F.3d at 350, for the proposition
that a duty of inquiry arises "'when the circumstances would suggest to an investor of
ordinary intelligence the probability that she has been defrauded'"); Tregenza v. Great
Am. Commc'ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that the Supreme Court in
Lampfdid not address the issue of inquiry notice).
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cause the Supreme Court never acknowledged inquiry notice as the
correct standard, 21 lower-court precedent now appears to foreclose
these arguments.
A. The Development of a Statute of Limitations in Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 Actions
In Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, the Su-
preme Court determined the proper limitations period applicable in
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cases. 22 In doing so, the Court not only
definitively chose a limitations period to apply to these cases,2 3 but it
also articulated several policy concerns relating to the choice of a limi-
tations period.24
The plaintiffs in Lampffiled suit against, among others, a law firm
that aided in forming several partnerships in which the plaintiffs in-
vested. 25 The plaintiffs alleged that they were induced to invest in the
partnerships through misstatements in the offering documents. 26
The issue before the Court on appeal was the proper limitations pe-
riod to apply to such actions.2 7 The Court concluded that the limita-
tions period provided for in section 9(e) of the Exchange Act 28 is the
relevant limitations period for section 10(b) cases.29
More important than the ultimate holding of the case were the
policy concerns enunciated by the Justices. The majority noted that
equitable tolling is most appropriately applied where an injured party
fails to discover fraud "without any fault or want of diligence or care
on his part."3 ° The Court recognized that the three-year bar is incon-
sistent with equitable tolling, as the bar is meant as an absolute limita-
tion.3" However, the only reason the Court held that the one-year
21 See, e.g., Charles Benjamin Nutley, Comment, Triggering One-Year Limitations on Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 Actions: Actual or Inquiry Discovery ?, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 917, 950
(1993) (concluding that lower courts should follow an actual notice rather than an inquiry
notice approach "[a] bsent [c]ongressional action or Supreme Court clarification" with re-
spect to the statute of limitations).
22 501 U.S. at 364.
23 See id.
24 See id. at 363 (discussing equitable tolling considerations); id. at 376-79 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (emphasizing the importance of"a fair balance between protecting the legit-
imate interests of aggrieved investors, yet preventing stale claims").
25 Id. at 352 (majority opinion).
26 Id. at 352-53 (observing that the alleged misrepresentations included statements
that purchasers would receive significant tax benefits, that leasing would generate a profit,
that software was readily marketable, and that appraisals were accurate and reasonable).
27 See id. at 354.
28 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (2006) (providing a limitations period of "one year after the
discovery of the facts constituting the violation and . . . three years after such violation").
29 See Lampf 501 U.S. at 359-61.
30 Id. at 363 (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 348 (1874)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
31 See id.
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limitation is inconsistent with equitable tolling is because that limita-
tion was based on actual discovery of the facts constituting the claim;
because inquiry notice had not yet been applied in this context, there
was no purpose for the application of equitable tolling to save a plain-
tiff from the barring effect of inquiry notice.3 2 This fact will become
important in my analysis in Part IV.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, laid out in his dis-
sent other policy concerns relevant to the choice of a limitations pe-
riod. He noted how difficult it is for investors to bring section 10(b)
claims3 3-a difficulty that has been compounded by the more strict
pleading requirements discussed later in this Note. 34 Justice Kennedy
then stressed that too strict a limitations period would frustrate the
entire purpose of the statute. 35 Finally, he chastised the majority for
framing a rule that would make a section 10(b) action "all but a dead
letter for injured investors." 36 While the debate over the appropriate
limitations period has long been settled by the adoption of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,3 7 the concerns of the Lampf Court are still rele-
vant to the analysis of the proper inquiry-notice standard.38
B. The Circuit Courts' Application of the Statute of Limitations
While the Supreme Court has never held that inquiry notice is
sufficient to begin the running of the limitations period in section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cases, the circuit courts were quick to apply the
doctrine of inquiry notice in securities-fraud cases.3 9 Tregenza v. Great
American Communications Co.40 provides a representative example of
the circuit courts' application of the inquiry-notice standard as well as
an articulation of another of the policy concerns present in determin-
ing the proper notice standard.
32 See id. ("The 1-year period, by its terms, begins after discovery of the facts constitut-
ing the violation, making tolling unnecessary.").
33 See id. at 376-77 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing both practical and legal ob-
stacles to bringing a private section 10(b) claim).
34 See infra notes 59-63, 129-30, 135-37 and accompanying text.
35 See Lampf 501 U.S. at 377 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that the limitations
period adopted by the majority undermines the statutory purpose of "creating an effective
remedy for victims of securities fraud" (citation omitted)).
36 Id.
37 See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2006). This provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
altered the statute of limitations decided upon in Lampf The current statute states that
actions "may be brought not later than the earlier of... 2 years after the discovery of the
facts constituting the violation; or ... 5 years after such violation." Id.
38 See infra Part V.
39 See, e.g., Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 939 F.2d 1420, 1437 (10th Cir. 1991)
(deciding a mere month after Lampf that inquiry notice applied in section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 actions).
40 12 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1993).
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The Seventh Circuit in Tregenza held that, even though Congress
did not specify that inquiry notice was sufficient to start the running of
the statute of limitations, it did not follow that actual notice was re-
quired.41 Notably, Judge Richard Posner recognized that his holding
was not based on the Supreme Court's decision in Lampf as that case
contained dicta that went both ways. 42
Judge Posner also recognized that policy concerns compelled the
court to adopt inquiry notice as opposed to actual notice. 43 In
Tregenza, an investor was told that the stock he was purchasing was
undervalued and would soon be worth twice as much. 44 Within a year,
however, the stock had lost nearly ninety percent of its value.45 Judge
Posner feared that if an investor suspicious of fraud were held to the
generous actual notice standard, he would be tempted to eschew inde-
pendent investigation and forgo filing suit in an attempt to see if the
price of the stock would recover.46 If the stock price recovered, the
investor would realize capital gains; if the stock price did not recover,
the investor could file suit and attempt to recover damages. Judge
Posner recognized this policy concern as a reason for imputing in-
quiry notice to an investor.47 This policy concern will become rele-
vant in Part V of this Note, where I argue that inquiry notice is
appropriate, albeit with sufficient limitations.
In the short span of two years after Lampf the circuit courts inte-
grated a standard of inquiry notice into Section 10(b) and Rule IOb-5
doctrine. As the next Part will show, two circuits in particular have
articulated very different standards that treat similarly situated inves-
tors in very different ways.
II
LENTELL AND DEBENEDICTIS: THE SECOND AND THIRD
CIRCUITS PART WAYS
As the circuit courts incorporated inquiry notice into securities-
fraud cases, some courts moved toward a rule requiring firm- and is-
41 See id. at 721-22 (noting that statutes of limitations usually do not include extensive
accrual and tolling provisions and asserting that such are matters to be determined by the
courts).
42 See id. at 718. This recognition is relevant because this area had been completely
populated by circuit courts of appeals' decisions and has now become significantly con-
fused by various standards for inquiry notice. See infra Part II.
43 See Tregenza, 12 F.3d at 722 (defending inquiry notice as a means of preventing
opportunistic claims).
44 Id. at 719-20.
45 Id.
46 See id. at 722 (asserting that if the statute of limitations were based on actual notice,
"the opportunistic use of federal securities law to protect investors against market risk
would be magnified").
47 See id.
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sue-specific storm warnings to trigger the running of the limitations
period, while others imputed inquiry notice on investors based on the
presence of general storm warnings. The Second Circuit, in Lentell v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., took the position that specific storm warnings are
required. 48 The Third Circuit, based on its holding in DeBenedictis v.
Menill Lynch & Co., appears to be moving toward a standard requiring
only general storm warnings.49 This Part will provide a background of
these cases and will analyze the differences between the two, showing
that while the DeBenedictis court claimed to be following the standard
set forth in Lentell, the Third Circuit clearly parted ways with the Sec-
ond Circuit by allowing inquiry notice based on general, and some-
times conflicting, storm warnings.
A. The Second Circuit Standard: Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Lentell v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., enunciated an inquiry-notice standard based on specific
storm warnings.50 While this case seems to be best known for its im-
pact on the loss-causation requirements of the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act,51 it has considerable implications for inquiry
notice in section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 cases. In Lentell, the plaintiffs
filed suit against Merrill Lynch and Henry Blodget, Merrill's former
star analyst. 52 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants issued false
and misleading statements recommending the purchase of shares of
24/7 Real Media, Inc. and Interliant, Inc., which the plaintiffs pur-
chased.53 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants made these state-
ments to attract additional investment banking business to Merrill
Lynch. 54 Essentially, the plaintiffs claimed that there was a breach in
Merrill Lynch's firewall separating the Internet Group, responsible for
rating internet securities, and the investment bankers soliciting busi-
ness from many similar companies.55
The court held that a duty to inquire arises "when the circum-
stances would suggest to an investor of ordinary intelligence the
48 396 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Storm warnings in the form of company-specific
information probative of fraud will trigger a duty to investigate.").
49 492 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2007) ("A plaintiff in a securities fraud action is put on
inquiry notice when a 'reasonable investor of ordinary intelligence would have discovered
the information and recognized it as a storm warning.'" (quoting Benak ex rel. Alliance
Premier Growth Fund v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., 435 F.3d 396, 400 (3d. Cir. 2006))).
50 Lentell, 396 F.3d at 169.
51 See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-Leading Cases, 122 HARv. L. REv. 276, 489
n.32 (2008) (noting citation to Lentell by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Stoneridge Invest-
ment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 776 (2008)).
52 Lentell, 396 F.3d at 164.
53 Id.
54 See id.
55 See id. at 165.
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probability that she has been defrauded. ' 56 If an investor makes no
inquiry into the probable fraud after the duty arises, knowledge is im-
puted as of that date; if the investor makes some inquiry, knowledge
of what a reasonable investor would have discovered is imputed, and
the limitations period begins to run as of the date the reasonable in-
vestor would have discovered the fraud.57 The court noted that the
limitations period should not force plaintiffs to file suit before they
can reasonably discover the facts necessary to state their claims. 5
8
The court also took time to illustrate the connection between the
strict pleading requirements in securities-fraud cases imposed by the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199559 (PSLRA) and the
doctrine of inquiry notice. 60 This extremely fact-intensive version of
pleading is very burdensome for plaintiffs, and-as the court in Lentell
correctly pointed out-it is important to consider the effect any stan-
dard of inquiry notice will have on the plaintiffs ability to allege the
facts necessary to form a valid complaint under the PSLRA. The court
noted that no plaintiff should be required to file suit before the facts
are available to meet the strict pleading requirements of the PSLRA.61
To reconcile inquiry notice with the PSLRA pleading requirements,
the court held that the facts necessary to begin the running of the
limitations period must "relate[ ] directly to the misrepresentations
and omissions the [p]laintiffs allege in their action against the defend-
ants."62 The court specifically held that " [s] torm warnings in the form
of company-specific information probative of fraud will trigger a duty
to investigate. '63
Applying the rules articulated above to the specific facts of the
case, the court found the storm warnings insufficient to impute in-
56 Id. at 168 (quoting Levitt v. Bear Stearns & Co., 340 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006). The PSLRA enacted strict pleading requirements for
securities fraud cases. To plead a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must allege that the
defendant made a material misstatement or omission, including the reason or reasons why
the statement is misleading, and, if the allegation is made on information and belief, the
plaintiff must state with particularity the facts on which the belief is formed. Id. § 78u-
4(b) (1). The complaint must also state with particularity the facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the state of mind required to sustain the action.
Id. § 78u-4(b)(2). Finally, the plaintiff must also plead facts proving that the defendant's
act or omission caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover. Id. § 78u-4(b) (4).
60 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 168-69.
61 See id. at 168.
62 Id. (quoting Newman v. Warnaco Group, Inc., 335 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
63 Id. at 169.
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quiry notice to the plaintiffs. 64 The court held that the limitations
period could have been triggered in this case only by data that related
directly to the claims that the plaintiffs alleged against Merrill
Lynch. 65 The district court, by contrast, had ruled that the plaintiffs
were placed on notice by eleven generic articles relating to structural
conflicts in the financial services industry.66 In an order denying re-
consideration of its statute-of-limitations determination, the district
court closely analyzed several news articles reporting that Wall Street
financial firms were recommending specific securities in order to
drum up business for their investment banking departments67-the
exact facts alleged by the plaintiff against Merrill Lynch. 68 However,
the Second Circuit found the articles insufficient to place plaintiffs on
inquiry notice of the frauds alleged 69 and held that "[c] onflicts of in-
terest present opportunities for fraud, but they do not, standing
alone, evidence fraud .... Something more than conflicted interest is
required [to trigger a duty to investigate], no matter how well publi-
cized the conflict may be." 70 The court went on to state that the arti-
cles relied upon by the district court "say[ ] nothing about 24/7
Media or Interliant; neither company is mentioned in any article." 7t
This statement indicates that the Second Circuit requires not only is-
sue-specific storm warnings to trigger a duty to investigate, but also
company-specific storm warnings before the limitations period begins
to run. Holding otherwise would violate the strict pleading require-
ments of the PSLRA.
Commentators have noted that Lentell inserted the often-absent
elements of reasonableness and fact-specific inquiry back into the in-
64 See 1d. at 69-71 ("This is not a fraud that can be apprehended 'simply by examin-
ing . . . financial statements and media coverage' of the issuers." (quoting Levitt v. Bear
Stearns & Co., 340 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2003))).
65 See id. at 169.
66 See id. at 170.
67 See In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 383-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). One
article in the Wall Street Journal quoted a former Wall Street analyst as saying, "'The Chinese
wall that existed at most brokerage houses between analysts and investment bankers has
broken down.'" Id. at 384. The article also indicated that analysts privately conceded that
sell ratings were bad for the firm's investment banking business. See id. One article in
Business Week indicated that the consequence of the firewall breakdown was the elimination
of the sell rating from the analysts' vocabulary. The article quoted a Wall Street compensa-
tion consultant as saying, "'[t]he analyst today is an investment banker in sheep's cloth-
ing.'" Id. at 386. An article in The Economist stated that many banks tied analysts'
compensation packages to the profit of the firm's investment-banking group. Id. at 386.
These article excerpts illustrate the extreme similarity between the information conveyed
in the news articles and the facts that formed the basis of the plaintiffs' complaint.
68 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
69 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 171.
70 Id. at 170.
71 Id. at 171.
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quiry-notice evaluation conducted by many prior courts. 7 2 The Lentell
court held that, even though the news articles reported on a breach in
the firewall between investment bankers and departments providing
stock recommendations at many firms, the articles could not serve to
excite inquiry because they did not deal directly with Merrill Lynch or
the other companies involved. 73 This holding indicates that, regard-
less of the number of generic storm warnings-eleven articles in this
instance 74-even if the articles deal directly with the facts alleged in
the specific case, generic articles cannot serve to impute inquiry no-
tice to a potential plaintiff.75
Notably, the Second Circuit did not create an inflexible rule but
opted to retain a case-specific inquiry into whether the facts suffice to
excite inquiry.76 I will argue in Part V of this Note that this flexibility
is necessary to achieve the correct balance between preventing oppor-
tunistic claims and accomplishing the goals of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 actions.
In Lentell, the Second Circuit established a workable standard for
securities-fraud cases. The standard is one that balances the necessary
policy concerns: the conflict between inquiry notice and the strict
pleading requirements of the PSLRA, and the conflict between
preventing opportunistic claims and achieving the goals of allowing
private policing of securities fraud.
B. The Third Circuit Standard: DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch &
Co.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in DeBenedictis v. Mer-
rill Lynch & Co., held that an injured investor's claim was time barred
on the basis of generic news reports and financial calculations of
which the investor was deemed to have knowledge. 77 In so holding,
the Third Circuit indicated that it does not require firm- and issue-
specific news reports to impute inquiry notice to an investor.78 In-
deed, a news report indicating that the investor's brokerage firm had
72 See, e.g., Devin F. Ryan, Comment, Yet Another Bough on the Judicial Oak": The Second
Circuit Clarifies Inquiry Notice and Its Loss Causation Requirement Under the PSLRA in Lentell v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., 79 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 485, 506 (2005) (asserting that even numerous
general storm warnings related to market-wide issues are not enough to place a reasonable
investor on inquiry notice of specific instances of fraud).
73 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 170-72.
74 See id. at 170.
75 See id. at 170-72.
76 See id. at 169 ("Our recent decisions reinforce the fact-specific nature of the limita-
tions defense, particularly where the claim is foreclosed by inquiry notice."); Ryan, supra
note 72, at 506-07.
77 492 F.3d 209, 218-19 (3d Cir. 2007).
78 See infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
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taken steps to prevent fraud was not enough to save the investor from
the Third Circuit's hammer of inquiry notice. 79
The plaintiff in DeBenedictis alleged that Merrill Lynch made ma-
terially misleading statements in the registration documents of a Mer-
rill Lynch mutual fund to induce investors to purchase Class B
shares.8 0 The plaintiff also alleged that Merrill Lynch failed to dis-
close a conflict of interest between brokers and investors stemming
from brokers' higher commissions for the sale of Class B shares.81
The Third Circuit imputed inquiry notice to the plaintiff based
on information included in the registration documents and several
news reports.8 2 The court first focused on statements made in the
registration documents. 83 It was undisputed that the registration doc-
uments laid out the fee structures for all classes of shares.84 However,
the plaintiff argued that the registration documents did not disclose a
conflict of interest between broker and investor solely because they
revealed that brokers received higher compensation over time for sell-
ing shares with higher fees.8 5 The court held that one sentence in the
registration documents placed the investor on notice of a potential
conflict of interest: "[S] ales personnel may receive different compen-
sation for selling different classes of shares. '8 6 The court explained
that this statement was sufficient to place the investor on notice of the
alleged conflict of interest and trigger his duty to investigate his claim
further.8 7
79 See DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 217-18 (rejecting plaintiffs argument that a news arti-
cle portraying Merrill Lynch in a "positive light" prevents the application of inquiry
notice).
80 Id. at 213-14. Because of high early redemption fees and annual fees, Class B
shares typically generate lower !ong-term returns that Class A shares. See Aaron Lucchetti,
Prudential Limits Brokers' B-Share Sales, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2001, at C23. If an investor is
purchasing $100,000 or more in shares, the investor is typically better off purchasing Class
A shares. However, brokers have received higher commissions on the sale of Class B
shares, which has created a conflict of interest between brokers and investors. See id.
81 DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 214.
82 See id. at 218-19.
83 See id. at 210-13 (quoting in part information included in the prospectus and a
separate statement of additional information).
84 Id. at 216. The registration statements laid out a chart showing the cost of Class B
and Class D shares for various holding periods based on a $10,000 investment and also
stated that "[i]f you hold Class B or Class C shares for a long time, it may cost you more in
distribution.., fees than the maximum sales charge that you would have paid if you had
bought one of the other classes." Id. at 213. The registration statements also stated that
investors "may elect to purchase Class A or Class D shares, because over time the accumu-
lated ongoing account maintenance and distribution fees on Class B or Class C shares may
exceed the initial charges and, in the case of Class D shares, the account maintenance fee."
Id.
85 See id. at 215.
86 Id. at 217 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87 See id.
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The Court also relied on several news articles in holding that the
plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the facts constituting his claims.88
The news reports at issue contained only general statements referring
to the possibility of fraud due to the different commission structures
for selling Class B shares.89 Several news releases from the National
Association of Securities Dealers indicated that other companies had
been censured and fined for selling Class B shares in violation of their
clients' interests.90 Notably, none of these articles or releases men-
tioned Merrill Lynch as having taken part in any of the fraudulent
actions.91
Admitting that the news articles were not company-specific, 92 the
court distinguished Lentell by citing dicta from the case stating that
general storm warnings can, in some instances, form the basis for im-
puting inquiry notice on an investor, specifically where the general
storm warnings relate directly to the claim put forth by the investor.93
The court analyzed a Wall Street Journal article that described the po-
tential conflict of interest and one brokerage firm's step of barring
the sale of Class B shares, without further approval, to purchasers in-
vesting more than $100,000.94 The article made no mention of any
particular wrongdoing by Merrill Lynch but instead portrayed the
firm as taking steps to prevent the fraud from occurring. 95 Nonethe-
less, the Third Circuit held that the article did not refute other ge-
neric news articles that placed the investor on notice of the potential
conflict of interest.96 In so holding, the court claimed to be following
the standard laid out in Lentell;97 however, a comparison of the cases
reveals that they lay out very different standards.
88 See id. at 217-18.
89 See id. at 214 (quoting articles appearing in USA Today, Time Magazine, and the Wall
Street Journal).
90 See id. at 214-15.
91 See id.
92 See id. at 217.
93 See id. at 217-18 ("We do not mean to suggest that inquiry notice could never be
established on the basis of non-specific public-pronouncements, but the level of particular-
ity in pleading required by the PSLRA is such that inquiry notice can be established only
where the triggering data relates directly to the misrepresentations and omissions alleged."
(quoting Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2005))) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
94 See id. (citing Lucchetti, supra note 80).
95 See id. at 218 (citing Lucchetti, supra note 80).
96 See id. Near the end of the article, the author noted that Merrill Lynch "handles
such issues through broker training and education." Lucchetti, supra note 80.
97 See DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 217-18 (rejecting plaintiffs interpretation of the Lentell
standard by citing dicta in Lentell stating that "'non-specific public-pronouncements'"
could, under the right circumstances, trigger inquiry notice (quoting LenteU, 396 F.3d at
171)).
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C. Differences Between the Second and Third Circuits' Inquiry-
Notice Standards
While the DeBenedictis court explicitly claimed to be following the
logic developed by the Second Circuit in Lentell, it clearly set its own
inquiry-notice standard by allowing general-and sometimes conflict-
ing-storm warnings to serve as the basis for imputing inquiry notice
to injured investors.
The DeBenedictis holding is based on two distinct determinations.
First, the Third Circuit found that the registration documents in ques-
tion provided sufficient information to inform the plaintiff that hold-
ing Class B shares for a significant period of time may lead to higher
fees.98 In this regard, the court's decision and the Second Circuit's
decision in Lentell are compatible. The prospectus provided to the
plaintiff in DeBenedictis contained both company- and issue-specific in-
formation, albeit buried information,99 thus meeting the standard laid
out in Lentell.
The second key determination in DeBenedictis was that general
news articles placed the investor on inquiry notice of the potential
conflict of interest due to the higher commissions paid to brokers for
selling Class B shares.1 00 With this finding, the court broke with the
standard laid out in Lentell and established a more aggressive form of
inquiry notice. The news articles in DeBenedictis bore an almost identi-
cal and direct relation to the plaintiff's claim, as did the news articles
in Lentell. In Lentell, the news articles clearly indicated that the firewall
between investment bankers and analysts had been breached at some
companies. 10 1 In DeBenedictis, the news articles stated that at some
firms, brokers had been recommending Class B shares to investors,
against the investors' best interests, for higher commissions. 10 2 The
only significant difference between the two sets of facts is that in
DeBenedictis there was an additional article portraying Merrill Lynch in
a positive light because it was taking steps to prevent fraud against its
clients.'0 3 Thus, if the DeBenedictis court had faithfully applied the
Second Circuit standard, as the court claimed to have been doing,
0 4
98 See id. at 216-17.
99 See id. at 216 (asserting that "'investors are presumed to have read prospectuses,
quarterly reports, and other information related to their investments"' (quoting Benak ex
rel. Alliance Premier Growth Fund v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., 435 F.3d 396, 402 (3d
Cir. 2006))).
100 See id. at 217-18.
101 See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2005); supra note
67 and accompanying text. Indeed, several articles stated facts nearly identical to the facts
alleged by the plaintiff. See Lentel, 396 F.3d at 167.
102 See DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 214-15; supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
103 See DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 218; supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
104 See DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 217-18; supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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it would have deemed the articles insufficient to place the investor on
inquiry notice.
Another difference between the opinions results from asking the
question: accepting that the registration statements advised the inves-
tor that Class B shares could be more expensive than other classes of
shares, does this mean that the DeBenedictis court was correct in imput-
ing inquiry notice to the plaintiff? Both the DeBenedictis court and the
Lentell court held that the imputation of inquiry notice to the investor
triggers a duty to investigate.10 5 However, the DeBenedictis court ap-
pears to have confused these two steps.
The DeBenedictis court indicates that every mutual fund purchase
places an investor under a duty to run fee calculations and second-
guess his broker's recommendation.' 0 6 The Lentell court would likely
disagree. The Lentell court stated that "[i] nquiry notice... gives rise to
a duty of inquiry when the circumstances would suggest to an investor
of ordinary intelligence the probability that she has been de-
frauded."' 0 7 Under a proper application of the Second Circuit stan-
dard, a duty to investigate is not triggered until the circumstances
indicate the probability that the investor has been defrauded. Thus,
in Lentell, the duty to investigate and run the calculations would arise
only if the registration statements or the news reports were to raise the
probability of a conflict of interest.
This is an important difference between the two courts' opinions.
Lentel's approach limits the duty to investigate to situations in which
the investor is clearly on inquiry notice, providing a necessary limit on
the doctrine's heavy burden.10 8 Under the DeBenedictis standard,
which makes the fee structure part of inquiry notice, the investor is
required to run fee calculations each time he purchases mutual funds
to ensure that his broker made the correct recommendation and that
105 See DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 216 ("If the existence of storm warnings [is] adequately
established the burden shifts to the plaintiffs to show that they exercised reasonable due
diligence and yet were unable to discover their injuries." (quoting In re NAHC, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1327 (3d Cir. 2002))) (internal quotation marks omitted); Lentell,
396 F.3d at 168 (explaining that if no diligence is undertaken, knowledge is imputed as of
the date that the duty arose, and if some diligence is undertaken, the knowledge that a
reasonable investor would have discovered is imputed and the statute of limitations begins
to run as of the date that the reasonable investor would have discovered the facts constitut-
ing the fraud).
106 See DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 216 (asserting that since the registration statements
disclosed the fee structure for the different classes of shares, "investors could calculate on
their own whether one class of shares is more economically attractive than another"). This
suggests that the calculation of fees reveals the disparity between the broker's recommen-
dation and the actual fee structure of the classes of shares and triggers inquiry notice.
107 Lentell 396 F.3d at 168 (emphasis added) (quoting Levitt v. Bear Stearns & Co., 340
F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108 See infra Part V.B.
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there is no probability of fraud. 10 9 Under the Lentell standard, by con-
trast, the duty to run calculations is placed on the investor only after
he obtains notice of the probability of fraud due to the conflict of
interest stemming from the commission structure. This standard im-
poses the burden to investigate only after the probability of fraud has
been discovered; the standard for imputing inquiry notice and the
level of diligence required after the discovery of fraud are separate
inquiries.
Another discrepancy between the standards espoused in the two
cases relates to the probability of fraud needed to trigger inquiry no-
tice. Both the Lentell and DeBenedictis courts claimed to adhere to a
standard of probable fraud.110 However, the DeBenedictis court seems to
convert the standard into one imputing a duty of reasonable diligence
when there is a possibility that the investor has been defrauded. 1 1'
One can see the difference by looking at the news articles re-
ferred to in these cases. Generic news articles about a particular
fraudulent activity in the financial industry-such as those in
DeBenedictis"1 2-suggest only a possibility that fraud is being committed
by the investor's financial-services firm and that the fraud was commit-
ted in the investor's situation. In comparison, specific articles about a
fraudulent activity committed by the investor's particular financial-ser-
vices firm would eliminate the chance that the investor's firm was not
involved in fraud. I submit that articles rising to a high level of speci-
ficity place the investor on notice of probable fraud. Thus, the Lentell
court was correct in holding that the non-firm-specific news articles
did not indicate probable fraud; 113 but the DeBenedictis court would
have been correct in imputing inquiry notice based on nonspecific
articles only if it were applying a more aggressive standard of inquiry
109 Part IV.A will demonstrate that the DeBenedictis rule places a double cost on inves-
tors by requiring them to perform calculations their brokers were hired to do.
110 See DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 216 ("Information that may be deemed to constitute
inquiry notice includes:.., any financial, legal or other data that would alert a reasonable
person to the probability that misleading statements or significant omissions had been
made." (emphasis added) (quoting NAHC, 306 F.3d at 1326 n.5)); Lentell, 396 F.3d at 168
("Inquiry notice... gives rise to a duty of inquiry 'when the circumstances would suggest to
an investor of ordinary intelligence the probability that she has been defrauded."' (empha-
sis added) (quoting Levitt, 340 F.3d at 101)).
111 See DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 219 ("[T] he news articles questioning the profitability
of [Class B] shares and highlighting the possible conflict of interest would urge the reasona-
ble investor to return to the Registration Statements in order to evaluate the profitability of
his or her own investments and investigate their broker's conflict of interest.") (emphasis
added).
112 See id. at 214-16; supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
113 Indeed, the Lentell court placed great emphasis on the difference between probable
and possible fraud standards and the importance of using a probable fraud standard. See
Lentel, 396 F.3d at 168 ("' [T]he existence of fraud must be a probability, not a possibility.'"
(emphasis added) (quoting Newman v. Warnaco Group, Inc., 335 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir.
2003))).
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notice. Indeed, the DeBenedictis court mentioned the terms "possible"
and "possibility" throughout the opinion1 14 in holding that a "possible
conflict of interest would urge the reasonable investor" to perform
due diligence. 1 15 Part V will illustrate the importance of adhering to a
probability-of-fraud standard.
III
INQUIRY NOTICE IN OTHER CONTEXTS
A helpful method of analyzing the feasibility and logic behind a
standard of inquiry notice in securities-fraud cases is to compare that
standard to uses of inquiry notice in other contexts. Inquiry notice is
routinely used in both contract notice provisions and in property law.
The following analysis will show that the standard of inquiry notice
applied by the DeBenedictis court would lead to absurd results in these
other contexts, and thus must be analyzed further to determine
whether there is a reason to maintain this aggressive form of inquiry
notice for section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions.
A. Inquiry Notice in Property Law
Inquiry notice in property law provides a useful analogy that can
inform courts deciding on an inquiry-notice standard in section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 actions. In the property law context, inquiry notice is
imputed to the purchaser of real estate when the facts would "natu-
rally raise a suspicion in the mind of a reasonable . . .person and
necessitate an inquiry."1 16 This inquiry-notice standard also requires
specific information to impute notice to the purchaser-" [v] ague or
general rumors, surmises or conjectures based on hearsay.., are not
sufficient."' 1 7 For example, property law imputes inquiry notice to a
purchaser when a reasonable investigation by the purchaser would
have revealed that an individual is residing on the land to be
purchased. 118
If a court were to apply the DeBenedictis standard of inquiry notice
in the property law context, it would yield absurd results. The
DeBenedictis logic would essentially allow non-property-specific infor-
mation to place a purchaser on inquiry notice. Just as information
114 See DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 217, 219.
115 Id. at 219 (concluding that the "possible conflict" would cause the reasonable inves-
tor to analyze the profitability of the investments based on the information in the registra-
tion statements).
116 1 JOYCE PALOMAR, PATRON AND PALOMA ON LAND TITLES § 12, at 74 (3d ed. 2003).
117 Id.
118 See, e.g., Tompkins County Trust Co. v. Talandis, 690 N.Y.S.2d 330, 332-33 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1999) (stating that the plaintiff must be "without knowledge 'of facts that would
lead a reasonably prudent purchaser to make inquiry' regarding defendant's occu-
pancy ...." (quoting Nethaway v. Bosch, 605 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993))).
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about other brokers placed an investor on inquiry notice in DeBenedic-
tis,119 information about other properties could place a purchaser of
real estate on notice in the property law context. Illogical outcomes
would follow if general knowledge of adverse possessors on other
property or general knowledge of bad business practices among other
real estate brokers could impute inquiry notice to a purchaser of real
estate even in the absence of facts showing that the purchaser's target
real estate was the subject of adverse possession or that the purchaser
had been the victim of fraud. This standard would impute inquiry
notice, and a duty to investigate further, to a purchaser in almost
every instance. Clearly, this is not what the DeBenedictis court in-
tended, and the standard of inquiry notice applied by the Third Cir-
cuit should change to reflect the true intent of the court.
B. Inquiry Notice in Contract Notice Provisions
Another useful analogy involves inquiry notice in the context of
contract notice provisions. These cases typically involve situations
where a party is required by contract to give notice to another party if
certain circumstances arise. The question for the court is whether in-
quiry notice of the circumstances giving rise to a duty to notify should
be imputed to the notice-giving party. A simple case involving an ex-
cess insurance policy illustrates this point nicely. In Green Door Realty
Corp. v. TIG Insurance Co., the plaintiffs were required to give notice to
TIG, the excess insurer, if a claim arose that was likely to implicate the
excess insurance policy.1 20 A large fire occurred on the insured prop-
erty that was rumored to have caused serious injury. 121 The court im-
puted inquiry notice of the facts requiring notice to be given to TIG
hosed on these rumors of serious injury. 12 2 In doing so, this court
properly applied a standard of inquiry notice requiring specific infor-
mation about the event rather than general storm warnings.
Applying the DeBenedictis standard of inquiry notice would yield
absurd results in Green Door Realty. Under the DeBenedictis logic, the
plaintiff would be imputed with inquiry notice and a duty to investi-
gate solely on the basis of general knowledge that fires have on occa-
sion caused serious damage implicating excess insurance policies like
the plaintiffs, even absent facts regarding the specific fire on the in-
119 See supra Part I.B.
120 329 F.3d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 2003).
121 See id.
122 See id. at 288 (asserting that even though the plaintiffs did not have actual knowl-
edge of possible excess coverage liability until a tort action was filed, the rumors were
"sufficiently serious" to cause the insured to be concerned about his coverage and put the
plaintiffs on "inquiry notice that they might be subjected to liability in excess of their pri-
mary insurance coverage").
15092009]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
sured property. This illogical result again cannot possibly be the re-
sult intended by the courts in applying inquiry notice.
IV
POLICY CONCERNS RELEVANT TO THE INQUIRY-
NOTICE STANDARD
A proper standard of inquiry notice should address and balance
three main policy concerns: avoiding the imposition of a double cost
on investors; preventing fraudulent claims without barring valid
claims; and providing certainty in the law.
A. Imposing a Double Cost on Investors
The DeBenedictis standard of inquiry notice combined with a re-
quirement that investors engage in reasonable diligence imposes an
unacceptable double cost on investors. Paul Zak and Stephen Knack
explain that as trust decreases, monitoring costs increase. 123 While
their article focuses on how levels of trust correlate with the rise of
successful societies, 124 it is useful in illustrating how trust levels and
monitoring costs are negatively correlated. A court's application of an
aggressive, general-storm-warnings standard of inquiry notice effec-
tively causes an investor's trust in his broker to decrease by requiring
him to investigate his broker on a more frequent basis.1 25 This in turn
increases the monitoring costs of the investor as the investor is forced
to investigate into any general storm warnings to determine whether
they apply to the investor's particular situation.
Thus, the DeBenedictis court, through its imposition of a general-
storm-warnings standard of inquiry notice, causes a wide class of inves-
tors to trust their brokers less, which increases the investors' monitor-
ing costs. In the case of the broker-investor relationship, the
phenomenon is more pronounced because the investor, in hiring the
broker, intended to avoid the monitoring costs of investing. The in-
vestor has essentially chosen to spend money in broker fees instead of
incurring the high cost of monitoring the investments himself. How-
ever, by employing an aggressive form of inquiry notice, a court elimi-
nates this option for the investor. The investor incurs costs not only in
the form of fees to the broker but also in the form of monitoring that
broker and investigating based on the mere possibility of fraud.
123 PaulJ. Zak & Stephen Knack, Trust and Growth, 111 ECON. J. 295, 297, 317 (2001)
(noting also the inverse relationship between monitoring and productivity: "[as] time
spent investigating approaches zero, ... trust-the proportion of time spent working-
approaches one").
124 See id. at 315 tbl.3 (providing data correlating trust and growth).
125 See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
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In addition to imposing on the investor the initial costs of moni-
toring the broker's actions, the court also inflicts a high litigation cost.
If the court requires the investor either to bring a claim based on
general storm warnings or risk losing that claim, that investor will face
pressure to bring a claim-which will likely end up being thrown out
on the pleadings due to the heightened pleading requirements of the
PSLRA. 126 This imposes yet another high cost on the investor, who
likely used a broker to avoid the costs of monitoring the
investment.127
Divorced from the aggressive use of inquiry notice, defining rea-
sonable diligence to include the performance of complex financial
calculations would not be entirely unreasonable, as the investor would
not be required to engage in monitoring very often. However, when
this standard of reasonable diligence is combined with the aggressive
use of inquiry notice, monitoring costs will naturally increase as the
investor is forced to perform high levels of diligence more frequently.
As will be shown in Part V, simply reducing the level of diligence nec-
essary after inquiry notice is triggered is not a viable option, because it
does not properly incentivize the investor to perform the high level of
diligence required when there is actually a probability of fraud. 128
Any form of inquiry notice will increase monitoring costs and im-
pose some level of double cost on the investor. However, the proper
standard of inquiry notice should balance the frequency of imposing
these costs with the policy concern of preventing the imposition of
double costs on the investor. This concern is even more important in
the securities-fraud context, in which the investor's decision to hire a
broker was likely made in part to avoid the costs of monitoring invest-
ments himself.
B. Preventing Fraudulent Claims Without Barring Valid Claims
The inquiry-notice standard employed by the Third Circuit keeps
some good claims out of court while encouraging many unsound
claims. This result subverts the purpose behind the limitations period
and strict pleading requirements: preventing abusive private securities
litigation.' 29 If courts continue the use of the aggressive style of in-
quiry notice found in DeBenedictis, the strict pleading requirements for
126 See infra Part JV.B.
127 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 695 (1984) (noting that nonprofessional investors can "put
their money in the hands of professional advisers or managers of mutual funds, thus get-
ting for themselves whatever advantage accrues to the insiders").
128 See infta Part V.B.2.
129 See Ryan, supra note 72, at 488-89 (including "curbing abusive private securities
litigation" as among "Congress's statutory intentions in drafting the PSLRA").
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section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 cases 130 will make it extremely difficult
for ultimately valid claims to survive past the pleading stage of
litigation.
If courts continue to apply aggressive inquiry notice, many valid
claims will not survive past the pleadings stage of litigation and many
unsound claims will be forced upon the courts. One of the important
purposes of the limitations period for section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
claims is to prevent opportunistic and fraudulent claims from being
brought.131 In addition, the legislative history of the limitations pe-
riod for section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 shows that Congress was con-
cerned with allowing investors enough time to adequately investigate
their claims so as not to bring premature claims to court.' 32 Senator
Adams of Colorado was particularly concerned that the one-year-after-
discovery limit would not allow investors alleging certain violations
enough time to investigate their claims. 133 If Congress was concerned
that a one-year actual notice rule gave investors inadequate time to
investigate and prepare claims, Congress would likely be frustrated
with the aggressive inquiry-notice standard employed in DeBenedictis.
Another, perhaps more pressing, concern is what happens to the
sound claims that are brought to court prematurely because of the
limitations period. Because securities fraud is difficult to detect, 34
the problem of sound yet incompletely developed claims is even more
important in this context. Section 21D(b) of the Exchange Act im-
poses heightened pleading requirements on plaintiffs in private secur-
ities-fraud actions.' 35 Essentially, the complaint must set forth three
specific facts: the statement alleged to be misleading, the reason or
reasons why the statement is misleading, and the facts that give rise to
a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind. 136 This is a high standard to meet for a plaintiff who is prema-
turely required to bring a claim before being able to adequately inves-
tigate it. The correct standard of inquiry notice must not "require
specific factual allegations ... and then ... punish the pleader for
waiting until the appropriate factual information can be gathered by
dismissing the complaint as time barred."' 37
130 See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 376
(1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The practical and legal obstacles to bringing a private
§ 10(b) action are significant.").
131 SeeTregenza v. Great Am. Commc'ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1993).
132 2 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 32:7 (2008).
133 Id. § 32:7, at 739.
134 Nutley, supra note 21, at 947.
'35 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006).
136 See id.
137 Levitt v. Bear Stearns & Co., 340 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that, in a
securities-fraud action, a court should consider what information was available to the plain-
tiff and when it was available before determining whether the plaintiff's claim is time
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C. Providing a Standard That Will Promote Certainty in the Law
When a court allows general storm warnings to trigger the limita-
tions period, this increases both the uncertainty regarding when the
limitations period begins to run and the cost imposed on the plaintiff
in monitoring his potential claims.1 38 The aggressive use of inquiry
notice also increases the level of uncertainty in the law by preventing
plaintiffs from knowing exactly when the statute of limitations will bar
their suits. 13 9 While a standard of actual notice would promote the
greatest amount of certainty in the law,1 40 Part V of this Note will ex-
plain why an actual notice standard will not adequately effectuate the
goals of the legislature.' 4 ' Thus, some form of inquiry notice is re-
quired both to prevent fraudulent or opportunistic claims and to pro-
vide relatively clear guidance to investors about when to bring their
claims. Part V will explain why the standard employed by the Second
Circuit in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co. is the correct approach. 142
Additionally, the correct standard of inquiry notice must balance
the costs imposed on injured investors. Some have argued that litiga-
tion to determine what information was available to the plaintiff and
when it was available is not worth the costs when considering the lim-
ited effect this determination has on preventing fraudulent claims.' 43
Thus, a balance must be struck between the goals of the legislature
and the concern that the standard adopted does not overly burden
the court system.
V
DEFENDING INQUIRY NOTICE BUT ARGUING FOR A VERSION
OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT STANDARD
The often-made argument for the rejection of inquiry notice in
favor of actual notice is not only foreclosed by judicial precedent,1 4 4 it
barred); see also Nutley, supra note 21, at 948 ("[P]laintiffs will often be stuck between
risking what may be a frivolous suit filed timely on skimpy facts, and spending time investi-
gating further on the chance that the short fuse may be running and later bar a legitimate
action.").
138 See Ryan, supra note 72, at 506.
139 See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, SEC Rule lOb-5 and Its New Statute of
Limitations: The Circuits Defy the Supreme Court, 51 Bus. LAw. 309, 334 (1996) (arguing for a
standard of actual notice and noting that this standard would provide the maximum
amount of certainty in the law).
140 See id.
141 See infra Part V.A.
142 See infra Part V.B.
143 See, e.g., Nutley, supra note 21, at 950 ("Put bluntly, finding the distinction between
'whether plaintiffs should have known' and 'when plaintiffs actually knew' is not worth the
costs imposed on litigants and courts in the exercise.").
144 See, e.g., DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 492 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2007);
Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2005).
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is foreclosed by logic and its frustration of the legislature's intent in
providing for a short limitations period. Thus, a form of inquiry no-
tice is necessary in securities-fraud actions. This Part will argue that
the correct standard of inquiry notice is a version of the standard em-
ployed by the Second Circuit in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.
A. Inquiry Notice is Necessary to Prevent Opportunistic Claims
A standard of actual notice in securities-fraud cases would not ac-
complish the goals of the legislature in passing section 10(b) or the
goals of the courts in implying a private right of action to balance the
need for private enforcement of securities fraud with the need to pre-
vent fraudulent claims from overly burdening the courts. Without in-
quiry notice, an opportunistic investor would be able to wait and see if
his stock price recovers prior to bringing his claim.1 45 This would al-
low the investor to hold the litigation threat as insurance for the sce-
nario in which his investment does not recover. If the investment
recovers, then the investor does not bring the claim; if the investment
does not recover, then the investor brings the claim. The opportunis-
tic investor would simply remain willfully ignorant of the facts of the
fraud and only make an attempt to uncover the facts after it is deter-
mined that it is financially beneficial to file suit. Judge Posner de-
scribed this undesirable situation as " [h] eads I win, tails you lose. '" 146
From a policy perspective, investors should have an obligation to
monitor their investments in some way to ensure that they are not
being defrauded. Courts should not give investors a free pass to be
completely trusting of their brokers while ignorant of facts constitut-
ing fraud that are easily discoverable. Thus, inquiry notice is desirable
over actual notice because it requires investors to monitor what their
brokers do and ensure that they are not being defrauded. However,
the correct standard of inquiry notice should not lower the level of
trust to a degree that imposes too great a monitoring cost on the
investor. 147
The inquiry-notice standard also gives courts the flexibility to cre-
ate fairness by screening out claims that were clearly delayed through
the use of willful ignorance.1 48 If actual notice were the standard,
145 SeeTregenza v. Great Am. Commc'ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1993) (discuss-
ing the threat of lawsuit as insurance for an opportunistic investor by stating: "If the stock
rebounded from the cellar they would have investment profits, and if it stayed in the cellar
they would have legal damages"); supra Part I.B.
146 Tregenza, 12 F.3d at 722.
147 See Zak & Knack, supra note 123, at 297-306 (arguing for a transaction-cost-based
explanation for the significance of "interpersonal trust" and for the benefits of trust to
economic growth); supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
148 See, e.g., Altschul v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 591, 594
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (granting summary judgment in favor of the broker where the plaintiff
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courts would have much less flexibility to do justice because dis-
missing a claim on statute-of-limitations grounds would require a
holding that the investor had actual knowledge of the fraud. Thus, an
inquiry-notice standard is necessary to provide courts with needed
flexibility. However, because the limitations period also imposes a bar
on any claims brought more than five years after the date of the
fraud, 149 the standard of inquiry notice need not be very aggressive, as
the willfully ignorant plaintiff must bring his claims before the uncom-
promising ultimate bar takes effect.
B. Inquiry Notice Can Be Applied Without Stifling Private
Policing of Securities Fraud
Having established that a standard based on actual knowledge of
the securities fraud is inadequate, the courts should fashion a stan-
dard of inquiry notice that takes into account all relevant policy con-
cerns and balances them in a way that produces an equitable
outcome. The following factors inform a system of inquiry notice that
is effective in preventing opportunistic claims, yet still allows injured
investors the time they need to investigate their claims fully and de-
velop the facts necessary to meet the heightened pleading require-
ments of the PSLRA.1 50
1. Inquiry Notice Should Be Imputed Only on the Basis of Company-
and Issue-Specific Information
First, inquiry notice should only be imputed to investors based on
company- and issue-specific information that is not conflicting. While
the DeBenedictis court claimed that its standard of inquiry notice fit
within the st2ndard_ imposed by the Lentell court,' 5 ' it does not. As
explained in Part II.C of this Note, the DeBenedictis court parted ways
with the Lentell court by allowing general news articles to form the
basis for imputing inquiry notice to investors. 5 2 A court seeking a
workable inquiry-notice standard must reject the Third Circuit's
DeBenedictis reasoning.
A standard of inquiry notice not requiring company- and issue-
specific storm warnings would trigger notice too frequently. This is
not a desirable result considering the high level of diligence both cir-
cuits require of investors once they cross the inquiry-notice thresh-
"had full knowledge of the speculative nature of his investments and ... failed to object to
the course of investment until the gamble failed").
149 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2) (2006).
150 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
151 See DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 492 F.3d 209, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2007); supra
note 104 and accompanying text.
152 See DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 217-18; supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
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old.' 53 Combining an inquiry-notice standard based on general storm
warnings with a high level of diligence required after inquiry notice
has been imputed implicates the policy concern of avoiding double
costs on investors.' 54 Thus, a workable standard of inquiry notice
should require both company- and issue-specific information rather
than the general storm warnings permitted in DeBenedictis.
2. Inquiry Notice Should Be Triggered Infrequently, but Should Be
Combined with a Requirement of a High Level of Diligence
in Investigating the Securities Fraud
Second, a workable standard of inquiry notice should balance the
ease with which the inquiry-notice standard is triggered with the bur-
den placed on the investor to perform reasonable diligence after the
standard is triggered. As explained above, combining an aggressive
form of inquiry notice with a high investor-diligence requirement is
indefensible. However, courts must determine the optimal level. For
instance, if the level of reasonable diligence required of an investor is
low, inquiry notice could be imputed to the investor more frequently
with little harm. This approach would allow general storm warnings
to trigger the duty to investigate but would not impute knowledge to
an investor as long as a basic investigation revealed no fraud.
The opposite situation is where the level of reasonable diligence
required of an investor is high, and the inquiry-notice standard is not
lightly triggered. This appears to have been the situation in Lentell,
where the court required a high degree of reasonable diligence of an
investor but only after company- and issue-specific information trig-
gered the duty to investigate.' 5 5
The correct standard for inquiry notice should require a high
level of reasonable diligence and only trigger inquiry notice on the
basis of company- and issue-specific information. Such a standard in-
centivizes an investor to perform the greatest amount of diligence in
uncovering potential fraud when there is the highest probability that
fraud has actually occurred. It would be absurd to require an investor
to perform a mediocre investigation on the basis of every general
storm warning. This would accomplish virtually nothing and would
impose high monitoring costs on the investor.156 On the contrary,
courts should incentivize the investor to perform a full investigation
when company- and issue-specific information indicates a probability
153 See DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 216 (requiring an investor to perform calculations to
determine the costs of several different classes of shares based on information in the regis-
tration statements); Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2005) (re-
quiring an investor to exercise reasonable diligence in discovering the fraud).
154 See supra Part W.A.
155 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 168.
156 See supra Part V.A.
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that the investor has been defrauded. This standard will impose high
monitoring costs and compel investors to take the costly steps of fully
investigating the potential fraud only in rare instances where com-
pany- and issue-specific information indicates that fraud has probably
occurred.
3. Inquiry Notice Should Be Based on a "Probability of Fraud"
Standard
Third, the correct standard of inquiry notice should trigger a
duty to perform reasonable diligence only when there is a "probability
of fraud" rather than a mere "possibility of fraud."' 5 7 While the
DeBenedictis court claimed to have been adhering to a "probability of
fraud" standard, the court referred only to a "possible" conflict of in-
terest1 58 and permitted general news articles to serve as the basis of
inquiry notice, 159 indicating that the court actually employed a "possi-
bility of fraud" standard. This is the kind of behavior that courts
should avoid. If a court decides to employ a "possibility of fraud" stan-
dard, the court should be candid about that decision. A court creates
great uncertainty in the law when it claims to be applying a
"probability of fraud" standard while its holding actually promotes a
standard that requires much less to trigger reasonable diligence.
While neither of these standards can be applied mathematically,
there is surely a difference between "probability" and "possibility," just
as there is a difference between "beyond a reasonable doubt" and "by
a preponderance of the evidence." 160 Courts should begin to use the
same language in deciding inquiry-notice cases. By employing the
same probability-of-fraud standard, courts will begin to apply the doc-
trine in a similar fashion and the case law will begin to provide some
guideposts for litigants determining when to file their suits. The
probability-of-fraud standard will also allow courts to require specific
information, as only specific information can raise a probability of
fraud.
157 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 168 ("[T]he existence of fraud must be a probability, not a
possibility." (emphasis added) (quoting Newman v. Warnaco Group, Inc., 335 F.3d 187, 193
(2d Cir. 2003))); Marks v. CDW Computer Ctrs., Inc., 122 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 1997)
("The facts constituting [inquiry] notice must be ... sufficiently advanced beyond the
stage of a mere suspicion .... (quoting Fujisawa Pharm. Co. v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332,
1335 (7th Cir. 1997))); supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
158 See DeBenedictis, 492 F.3d at 216-17 (concluding that the registration statements put
investors on notice of "the possibility that.., sales personnel may receive different commis-
sions in relation to the type of shares they sold") (emphasis added).
159 See id. at 217-18; supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
160 See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 132, § 32:15, at 760 ("Although neither notice of facts
raising the 'possibility' or 'probability' of fraud can be applied with mathematical preci-
sion, there is a significant difference between suspecting that one possibly has been de-
frauded and suspecting that one probably has been defrauded.").
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4. Courts Must Recognize Their Power to Dismiss Opportunistic
Claims Under the New Standard of Inquiry Notice
The argument often advanced in favor of the aggressive use of
inquiry notice found in DeBenedictis is that opportunistic plaintiffs wait
to file their claims until after they are sure their investments will not
recover. This argument was succinctly stated by Judge Posner in
Tregenza.16 1 However, the rejection of an actual notice standard in
favor of inquiry notice accounts for this concern; the aggressive form
of inquiry notice articulated by the Third Circuit is unnecessary. In an
actual-notice system, the concern would be valid. However, as men-
tioned earlier, the strict five-year limitations period 16 2 already serves to
bar suits by opportunistic investors. 163 Because this limitation is based
on the date of the injury, the amount of time the opportunistic inves-
tor has to delay after learning of the fraud is small. Because securities
fraud is generally hard to detect, 164 by the time the opportunistic in-
vestor discovers the fraud, the time left before the limitations period
bars the claim is minimal, and the ability of the investor to use the
possibility of litigation as an insurance policy is limited.
Additionally, a standard of inquiry notice requiring specific infor-
mation to trigger the duty to investigate still combats the problem of
the willfully ignorant plaintiff, because specific information is likely
available where the plaintiff remains willfully ignorant, and the court
would impose a high level of reasonable diligence on the investor to
determine if there was actual fraud. 16 5 Inquiry notice would be im-
puted to the opportunistic investor who eschews a reasonable investi-
gation, and the investor's case would be dismissed. Thus, a more
aggressive form of inquiry notice is not necessary to prevent opportu-
nistic claims because, in the face of an opportunistic claim under a
specific-information form of inquiry notice, a court will still have the
power to dismiss the case.
5. Inquiry Notice Must Be Defensible When Compared to Inquiry
Notice in Other Contexts
Finally, a comparison of inquiry notice in the securities-fraud con-
text to applications of the doctrine in other contexts shows that a stan-
dard of inquiry notice based on general storm warnings is not
161 See supra note 145 and accompanying text; supra Part I.B.
162 See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2) (2006).
163 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
164 See Nutley, supra note 21.
165 See DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 492 F.3d 209, 216-17 (3d Cir. 2007)
("'Plaintiffs cannot avoid the time bar simply by claiming they lacked knowledge of the
details [or] narrow aspects of the alleged fraud."' (quoting Benak ex rel. Alliance Premier
Growth Fund v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., 435 F.3d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 2006))).
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defensible. 166 The inquiry-notice standard employed by the DeBenedic-
tis court is more burdensome than the standard employed in both
contract-notice-provision and property-law contexts. 167 The different
treatments of the inquiry-notice standard are even more pronounced
considering that fraud is typically more difficult to discover in securi-
ties-fraud cases than in other situations. 168 Compared to real-property
owners, investors are in a much worse position to access information
regarding their securities. A real-property owner can simply walk onto
her land to determine whether an adverse possessor is likely on the
land. However, an investor must commit a great deal of time and
money to determine whether he has been defrauded. Thus, the in-
quiry-notice standard in securities-fraud cases must be at least less
stringent than what is required in the other contexts.
CONCLUSION
The correct standard for inquiry notice in the securities-fraud
context has long been debated, with many commentators arguing that
inquiry notice should be abandoned entirely in favor of a standard of
actual notice. This Note has illustrated that inquiry notice is needed
to prevent fraudulent and opportunistic claims from hampering the
ability of courts to enforce securities regulations through the hearing
of private actions. However, DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co. illus-
trates what can happen when the inquiry-notice standard is taken too
far and not applied with the underlying policy concerns in mind. The
standard applied by the Third Circuit in DeBenedictis places a great
burden on the investor to investigate his broker's actions; indeed, it
imposes a double cost on the investor. Even worse, the DeBenedictis
standard imposes this double cost on investors very frequently because
it triggers a duty to investigate based merely on the possibility that
fraud has occurred instead of requiring a probability that fraud has
occurred.
The DeBenedictis standard also creates great uncertainty in the
field and threatens to increase the number of fraudulent-or merely
premature-claims, as it forces investors to fully investigate their
claims based upon general storm warnings or risk having their claims
dismissed under the heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA.
The Third Circuit rule puts injured investors in the undesirable posi-
tion of having to undergo the high costs of litigation to maintain their
claims before investigation sufficient to meet the heightened pleading
requirements, for fear of losing their claims altogether.
166 See supra Part III.
167 See id.
168 See Nutley, supra note 21.
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As this Note has argued, inquiry notice can be used appropriately
by balancing all the policy concerns implicated by the standard. This
balance reveals a standard that imposes a relatively high burden of
diligence after notice is imputed but does not impute knowledge to
an investor unless the information available is company- and issue-spe-
cific and not conflicting. Such a standard only imposes the double
costs of the inquiry-notice system on the investor when there is an
actual probability that fraud has been perpetrated on that specific in-
vestor, not just on a large class of investors generally. This approach
ensures that when an investor discovers probable fraud, that investor
will take action to investigate it.
Additionally, appellate courts should begin to use the "probability
of fraud" language from Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.169 as a guidepost
in determining whether to impose the specter of inquiry notice on an
injured investor. Courts should strictly avoid using "probability of
fraud" language while employing a standard of inquiry notice that is
based on the mere possibility of fraudulent activity. This standard of
inquiry notice will provide plaintiffs with the certainty of knowing
when they must incur the double cost of monitoring and investigating
their brokers' actions or risk losing their claims. This in turn will al-
low plaintiffs the time needed to fully develop the facts of the proba-
ble fraud and avoid having their valid claims dismissed for failure to
meet the stringent pleading requirements of the PSLRA.
The form of inquiry notice proposed in this Note, combined with
the five-year ultimate limitation on securities-fraud claims, will pro-
mote the goals of private enforcement of securities regulations while
still barring fraudulent and opportunistic claims. Because securities
fraud is more difficult to discover than other types of fraud, investors
should be allowed the time necessary to develop the facts they need to
present a case that will vindicate their interests. A standard of inquiry
notice that forces injured investors to choose between bringing their
claims prematurely and risking the loss of their claims does not make
sense. Imposing a standard other than the one laid out in this Note
risks frustrating the purposes behind private enforcement of securities
fraud and placing yet another burden on injured investors.
169 See supra notes 110-15, 157-60 and accompanying text.
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